United States Bankruptcy Court Los Angeles Bankruptcy Court
Chapter 11 Business Bankruptcy Case: In re Brice Road Developments, LLC 6th Cir. BAP
To calculate a cramdown interest rate in a chapter 11 case, where an “efficient market” exists, the market rate should be applied, and where no “efficient market” exists, the formula approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp. should be employed.
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case: Zurich Am Ins v. Lexington Coal
The bankruptcy court did not err in disallowing the administrative claim sought by a debtor’s post-petition insurer for its unaccrued claim against the debtor based upon an actuarial estimate of amounts to become due under a “deductible policy” (ie. a policy where the insurer paid claims in full and then billed the debtor for the deductible).
Chapter 7 Personal Bankruptcy Case: In re Phillips Bankr. N.D. IL.
§ 330(a)(7) requires a Court to determine reasonable compensation for a Ch. 7 trustee as a commission with § 326(a) establishing a maximum cap thereon, but such cap is not an entitlement, nor is the trustee entitled to a statutory presumption of the appropriate allowable compensation for such services.
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case: In the Matter of United Operating, LLC 5th Cir.
In a suit following a bankruptcy case alleging mismanagement of debtor’s property during reorganization, summary judgment against debtor is affirmed where debtor, in agreeing to the bankruptcy reorganization plan, failed to retain its right to bring a post-confirmation action, and therefore lacked standing.
In the Matter of Yorkshire LLC 5th Cir.
Bankruptcy court’s order sanctioning debtors for filing two bankruptcy petitions in bad faith is affirmed where the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that the bankruptcy cases had been filed with a bad motive and with no meaningful thought being given to the actual purposes of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
Although a court generally may not look beyond the averments in a complaint in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it can look at public records, including judicial proceedings, in addition to the allegations in the complaint. Specifically, on a motion to dismiss, the court may take judicial notice of another court’s opinion not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity.
The district court did not err in dismissing a complaint based upon its conclusion that a bankruptcy court’s prior sale order was preclusive as to the claims asserted in the complaint. Where the claims in a complaint generally attack the value of the debtor’s assets, such claims go to the heart of a sale order and thus are claims that “should have been” brought in the context of a sale.
In re Storey 6th Cir. BAP
§ 1327 precludes modification of a confirmed plan under § 1329 to address issues that were or could have been decided at the time the plan was originally confirmed.
Teleglobe USA, Inc. et. al. v. BCE et. al.
Although a party is required to disclose a testifying expert’s report and all data or information considered by the expert in preparing the report, this rule does not require disclosure of prior drafts of the report prepared by the expert.
A testifying expert does not have to produce documents which are protected as core attorney work product (i.e., which reflect the attorney’s mental impressions and trial strategy). Rule 26 disclosures by testifying experts do not trump the attorney work product doctrine. Attorney work product continues to be protected by Rule 26 even if it is shared with a testifying expert. Factual information delivered to an expert by an attorney however, can be discoverable.
Where a witness uses a document to refresh his recollection before testifying, disclosure of that document is not automatic, but is within the court’s discretion. Such discretion must take account of any applicable privilege pertaining to the document.
When co-clients and their common attorneys communicate with one another, those communications are “in confidence” for privilege purposes. Hence the privilege protects those communications from compelled disclosure to persons outside the joint representation. Moreover, waiving the joint-client privilege requires the consent of all joint clients.
In re Elrod Holdings Bankr. DE
A secured creditor has standing to seek equitable subordination of another creditor’s claim so long as the injury underlying the subordination is particularized to the creditor seeking subordination (eg. is not an injury suffered by all creditors)